Competition between U.S. products and foreign products made with cheap labor is most intense in the U.S. domestic market. If low wages abroad were driving the American trade deficit, therefore, the share of imports from developing countries should have risen dramatically. But as table 2 indicates, the share of manufactured imports from developing countries in 1986 (25.9 percent) was about the same as the share in 1981 (25.0 percent). Indeed, the longer-run evidence throws even greater doubt on the cheap-wage argument, which implies an inexorable increase in the shares of imports from cheap-labor countries. In fact, U.S. imports show precisely the opposite behavior. In 1960, two-thirds of manufactured ifnports into the United States came from countries with income and wage levels less than half those in the United States. By 1986, the share from countries with income levels less than half those in the United States had dropped dramatically, to less than a third. In 1960, of course, Japan and many European countries had cheap labor by this definition; today they no longer do. If cheap labor really determined trade deficits, the United States should have had a much larger deficit in the 1960s, when much more of the world, by economic weight, had lower relative wages than it does today.
Finally, the progressive lowering of trade barriers between the United States and other developed countries was not associated with a leveling down of U.S. wages to those of foreign developed countries, but rather with rapid economic growth both here and abroad. Moreover, instead of permanently maintaining low wages, Europe and now Japan have wages that have converged to U.S. standards roughly in parallel with levels of productivity in all these countries. Although Japan continues to be frequently singled out as having the most unfair trading practices of all U.S. trading partners, it is doubtful that such policies have been a major cause of the dramatic increase in Japan's trade surplus with the United States since 1981. Table 2 indicates that the Japanese share of the deficit growth is virtually proportional to its 1981 trade share. In 1981, Japan accounted for 25.3 percent of U.S. manufactured imports and 6.1 percent of manufactured exports. Maintaining these 1981 shares in 1986 would have entailed a rise in the U.S. trade deficit with Japan of $38.4 billion, which is precisely the rise that occurred. In short, it appears that Japan simply maintained its share of the action rather than that it dramatically shifted its behavior as the unlevel playing field argument implies.
The Japanese trade balance over the long run also indicates that the protection in the Japanese market has not created a chronic tendency toward surplus. Between 1965 and 1973, Japan's current account balance averaged 1.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Between 1974 and 1984, it averaged 0.7 percent.
The pervasiveness and speed of the decline by commodity category and trading partner also suggests that a third frequently mentioned culprit-a loss in fundamental competitiveness due to weak innovation and poor product quality-is not, in fact, a major cause of the enlarged trade deficit. In short, a fundamental imbalance between U.S. production and spending since 1981 has necessarily produced a mushrooming trade deficit. Correspondingly, only a reversal of this imbalance can close the gap. How the United States chooses to accomplish that objective is perhaps the most important economic policy question facing the nation in the years ahead.
The Protectionist Prescription
Advocates of quota protection for U.S. industries claim that such policies could improve the trade balance, save jobs, provide firms with an opportunity to restore their international competitiveness, and preserve essential industrial capacity. In this section we consider these rationales for protection.
IMPROVING THE TRADE BALANCE
Claims that protecting industries can reduce the trade deficit can be best evaluated by viewing the current account balance as a function of national spending behavior. If, in an economy with fully employed resources or, alternatively, a constant level of unemployment, a quota levied on imports raises spending on domestic goods, imports elsewhere must rise to meet increased demand, or else resources must be drawn from other sectors of the economy, thus reducing exports. Just as squeezing a balloon will redistribute but not reduce the total amount of air in the balloon, so, in the absence of a change in total national spending, imposing quotas will change only the composition of trade, not the overall current account balance.6 6. While a quota may restrict the quantity of particular imports sold in the United States, it need not lower the dollar value of those imports. Indeed, by raising domestic and import prices a quota could actually worsen rather than improve the trade balance ex- To be sure, if total unemployment is allowed to vary, selective protectionist policies could raise production and income in specific sectors in the short run without reducing them in other sectors. Provided that some of the increased income is not spent, the current account balance would improve. The critical question, however, is whether the economy's total production, typically constrained by the amount of monetary growth the central bank will allow, could increase. Unless the bank accommodates a rise in domestic production, employment in industries competing with imports will simply increase at the expense of employment elsewhere. Expanded production of one product thus again entails decreased production of another.
Movements in the exchange rate provide one mechanism by which this process operates. In the short run, a quota may reduce imports, but if other factors remain unchanged, it will also increase the current account balance, strengthen the currency, and thereby make it more difficult for other sectors in the economy to compete internationally. Protecting such industries as steel and textiles, for example, will keep the dollar strong and consequently hurt export sectors such as computers and aircraft. For the medium and long term, in which the economy tends toward a given employment level, quotas are unlikely to have major effects on the trade balance unless policies are adopted to shift national spending patterns.
The current account balance equals the sum of net private saving (saving minus investment) and government saving (tax revenues minus government spending).7 The only way to improve the current account 7. This conclusion can be demonstrated from the accounting equality between the gross national product (GNP) and gross national income (GNI). GNP is the sum of private consumption (C), private investment (1), government spending (G), and exports of goods and services (X), minus imports of goods and services (M), or GNP = C + I + G + X -M.
GNI equals the sum of private consumption (C), private saving (S), and government taxes (T),or GNI = C + S + T.
Since, both valued at market prices, GNP must equal GNI, the two identities can be set equal to each other:
After C is subtracted from each side, these terms can be rearranged into a fundamental identity:
balance on a sustainable basis is to increase the sum of net private and government saving, either by increasing tax revenues or gross private saving or by reducing government expenditures or private investment. Quotas may have temporary effects on each of these variables but will not lead to a permanent improvement in the trade balance without permanent shifts in economywide saving and investment behavior.
SAVING JOBS
Even if monetary policy permitted total unemployment to vary, claims that quotas protecting certain sectors of the economy will increase overall domestic employment are also questionable. Protection may add to jobs within an industry, but it will also raise prices of the goods or services produced in that industry. Increased prices may lead to fewer jobs for those distributing protected goods and for workers using those goods to manufacture other products. A preliminary analysis of H.R. 1562, a textile quota bill passed by the House of Representatives in 1986, by the International Business and Economic Research Corporation, for example, estimated that while the quotas on foreign textiles would add about 71,000 jobs in the textile and apparel industries, almost as many jobs would be lost in the retail sector.8 Protection of an industry that produces intermediate goods has similar effects. By increasing domestic prices for steel, for example, quota protection undermines the competitiveness of the automobile and machinery industries-heavy users of steel.
Quotas may also take the form of provisions requiring domestic materials. These local content provisions also raise costs to consumers. As Gene Grossman has pointed out, the increase in the output of domestic components generated by domestic content requirements can be more than offset by the decrease in demand for final goods.9 Similarly, quotas can induce foreign suppliers to upgrade the quality of their products. The voluntary restraint agreements limiting imports of Japanese automobiles into the United States during the past five years were instru- Of course, proponents of protection have a narrower objective, that of assisting workers in particular industries. Quotas are, however, an expensive means of saving jobs because they raise prices paid by consumers on both the imported goods subject to quotas and the domestically produced goods with which they compete. Gary Hufbauer and Howard Rosen find that the cost to consumers per job saved by protection are "usually in the range of $20,000 to $100,000 per year and often exceed $150,000." 12 Murray Weidenbaum and Michael Munger also find that the annual costs for each job saved by protection have been high: $74,155 because of quotas on television receivers, $77,714 from tariffs and quotas on footwear, $85,272 from tariffs and quotas on carbon steel, and $110,000 on account of the "trigger price" system on steel.'3 As high as they are, these estimates are likely to understate the costs of using protection to preserve jobs. Proponents of protection are generally more interested in saving the particularjobs of those currently employed in an industry than in preserving industrywide employment in the aggregate. But specific jobs can rarely be saved. Protectionists believe that by diverting demand to domestic firms, quotas will improve the firms' profitability and prevent layoffs. But quotas may actually increase job loss and dislocation by raising investment, encouraging domestic firms to relocate, attracting foreign firms, and strengthening domestic monopolies in product and labor markets.
If protection stimulates investment and the substitution of capital for labor, more jobs could be lost than are saved. 14 And even in cases where protection has allegedly been effective in raising employment, industry relocation has increased worker dislocation. Of sixteen American industries studied by Robert Lawrence and Paula DeMasi that have received protection under the escape clause-which provides temporary protection from imports when the industry can prove it is being injured by imports-only one, the bicycle industry, expanded after it was protected. 15 And even in that instance, protection failed to save many of the jobs that existed when it was granted in 1955. Although overall production and employment in the bicycle industry grew after 1955, each of the three largest bicycle manufacturers closed plants and moved in the next five years.'6 To the degree that protection encouraged these firms to undertake long-term expansion, it also encouraged them to reexamine their choice of location.
Saving of union power in the labor market, wage levels in any industry depend on the strength of competition in the market for the final products of that industry. A quota that reduces competitive pressures from abroad will thus reduce the elasticity of demand for both final products and labor, encouraging higher union wages and reducing industrial employment.22
One might conclude from this discussion that a superior method of limiting dislocation from existing jobs is to subsidize employment directly, as several European countries have done. Yet in practice such subsidy programs may neither save jobs nor limit dislocation. Employment subsidies may inhibit dislocation when temporary shocks would otherwise cause firms to lay off workers, but if the shock turns out to be permanent, workers eventually lose theirjobs anyway when government coffers run dry. Historically, such budgetary shortfalls have forced governments to remove subsidies suddenly. In the long run, therefore, jobs are not only not saved, but large numbers of workers whose jobs are no longer economically viable may suffer more dislocation than they would have if the market had operated freely. The European experience does not suggest that less adjustment is required simply because it is delayed.23
RESTORING COMPETITIVENESS
The infant industry argument is the classic case in which protection is provided to allow a new industry to grow sufficiently to become a viable international competitor. Given the developed nature of the U.S. economy, the infant industry argument is rarely invoked, but a related argument calling for industry rejuvenation is. The frequently stated objective of protection is to allow import-damaged industries a breathing period in which to restore their competitiveness. But if an industry can be profitable once it has reequipped itself, why can't it enter the capital market to obtain the finances to tide itself over until it is profitable? Why are private participants in the capital market unable to recognize these opportunities? The answer implicit in the industry rejuvenation rationale for special trade assistance is that there is a major failure in the capital market.
The United States, however, has the best-developed capital market in the world. It has nearly 15,000 commercial banks, over 3,000 insurance companies and pension funds, and numerous highly talented and wellcapitalized investment banking houses, let alone the largest network of stock and bond exchanges in the world. With so many potential suppliers of capital and such a highly sophisticated system of financial intermediaries to channel their funds to capital users, there is no reason why the market should systematically fail to recognize and finance industries able to compete in the international marketplace. And even if such systematic errors were occurring, there does not seem to be any evidence suggesting that government officials or lawmakers have superior forecasting ability and are unable, by releasing their own information, to convince private participants of its value.
A related argument is that quotas or tariffs permit firms to modernize and restructure by allowing them to earn higher profits. This argument too ignores the possibility that companies could borrow from capital markets. It also presumes that only the management and owners of existing firms should be responsible for undertaking new investment. On occasion, however, ridden by inferior management or by debt from previous investment errors, existing firms may be ill suited to undertake new investments. Selling assets to more creditworthy owners rather than salvaging the returns on past investments may be the appropriate method for facilitating industrywide recovery.
Significantly, even protection may fail to promote an industry that is not viable in an unprotected market. When an industry producing a standardized product loses its comparative advantage, far more than the latest technology will be required to regain competitiveness. In fact, the passage of time may accentuate the cost differential between domestic and foreign firms. Given the rapid international diffusion of technology, foreign competitors can also modernize. In such cases the availability of protection as an option may divert the industry's attention away from eliminating unprofitable operations and toward efforts to maintain protective barriers.
Comparative rather than absolute advantage will determine the ultimate success of an industry in global competition. Proponents of protection for a particular industry may find it difficult to appreciate the importance of comparative advantage. Indeed, the preamble to the textile quota bill passed by the House of Representatives last year notes that increases in textile imports and import penetration in the U.S. market have occurred despite productivity increases in the past ten years that have surpassed increases in the rest of the economy.24 But the textile and apparel industries could have suffered an erosion in comparative advantage despite above-average productivity.
To be sure, some industries have made strategic errors that in time could be corrected. For example, the two oil shocks in the 1970s dramatically shifted the structure of demand for automobiles in the United States toward small cars, a shift that American manufacturers were not able to anticipate. Yet even in the case of correctable errors, the' impact of protection on modernization depends on the form of that modernization and whether protection is viewed as permanent or temporary. Import quotas to improve competitiveness may well prove counterproductive argue that protection would savejobs while the adjustment requirements would help restore the international competitiveness of import-damaged industries. However, conditioning aid on acceptance of adjustment mechanisms has pitfalls that are not well appreciated in much of the U. S. policy discussion.27 Setting conditions as a quid pro quo for protection presumes that the government-either alone or together with business and labor representatives-can better decide what form adjustment should take and how to accomplish it than can affected firms and their capital markets. While advocates of this approach believe it will result in a speedier transition to free trade, we are skeptical. In fact, given the political reluctance to abandon industries in trouble, it is likely that mandated adjustment would be biased towards requiring substantial reinvestment in importdamaged industries in the hope that new capital and modernized plants would restore competitiveness. While individual firms in depressed industries may survive by modernization, it is unlikely that mandating investment by all, as Congress did in the case of the steel industry in 1984, will mean that all will survive. On the contrary, such policies are more likely to perpetuate excess capacity and induce wasteful investment.
In cases where agreements call for the retirement of capacity, the conditionality approach produces another danger-cartelization. If import relief is to be conditional on specified actions by the industry, firms have strong incentives to arrive at tacit, or even explicit, understandings to coordinate their behavior. Indeed, it is no coincidence that such policies are frequently associated with the formation of cartels in Japan. While it may be necessary for an industry to restructure through mergers, these are better achieved in the open market than through collusion between industry participants. As we argue later, when industries are clearly subject to competitive pressures from imports, mergers should be allowed, but the government should not shift its stance from trustbusting to trust-building. Moreover, as Japanese and European experience makes clear, firms that make painful capacity retirement decisions to raise prices are likely to seek measures to prevent new entry by free riders from undermining their cartel arrangements. With effective car- By harming certain key domestic industries, trade can allegedly impair the national defense. But trade protection is a highly inefficient means of preserving production capacity of an industry deemed essential to national security. It would be far less costly to pay for the necessary capacity and stockpiles of products directly out of the federal budget.
Others have justified special government treatment by asserting a need to protect and support certain "basic" industries, such as steel, considered to be essential to the performance of other industries.28 The government, they argue, must shelter input-producing industries from import competition, or even subsidize them, to prevent the American industries relying on them from becoming vulnerable to price hikes or supply disruptions.
The first problem with this line of argument is that it applies only, if at all, to products for which international competition is weak-as it was for crude oil in the 1970s when the OPEC cartel had effective control over world oil prices. When competition among foreign producers is brisk, American purchasers have no reason to be concerned that domestic suppliers may be driven out of business or forced to shrink capacity because of predatory practices or more efficient operations of foreign producers. Indeed, American business will suffer if government misguidedly imposes a tariff or quota on imports of basic products because such measures would only raise prices and thereby reduce or destroy any competitive advantage American manufacturers of finished goods might enjoy in the international marketplace.
A produce inputs for other industries: lumber for wood products, copper for finished metal products, and cotton for textiles. Why should only one or two of these input-producing industries receive protection from imports?
A Pragmatic Policy for Preserving Open Trade
Over the past two years, there has been a substantial decline in the U.S. dollar. With time, this fall will improve the trade balance and alleviate many of the current protectionist pressures. Nonetheless, the dollar's fall is not a panacea. Its decline will reduce the purchasing power of U.S. consumers. The only way the nation can offset the real income loss that accompanies the decline in the value of the dollar is to raise productivity levels. A discussion of policy measures to accomplish that objective is beyond the scope of this article, but it is encouraging that both political parties are concentrating on the issue and considering policies to bolster educational and retraining efforts as well as research and development spending. In addition, the dollar's fall should be accompanied by shifts in both U.S. spending and trade policies. An effective policy must be capable not only of reversing national overspending without damaging investment, but also of holding protectionist pressures at bay during the potentially difficult transition to smaller trade deficits.
SHIFTING NATIONAL SPENDING PATTERNS
As the trade deficit declines, the imbalance between national spending and production can theoretically be narrowed either by reducing private investment, raising private saving, or reducing the government deficit, or by some combination of the three. All are neither equally desirable nor equally feasible.
The least desirable option is reducing private investment. At a time when U.S. firms are facing severe competitive pressures, America must, if anything, increase rather than lower its rate of investment. Yet in the absence of higher domestic saving, the decline in the trade balance and in the associated net inflow of foreign capital could raise real U.S. interest rates and crowd out domestic investment.
A second course-increasing private saving-is far more desirable, but not readily susceptible to changes in government policy. After decades of empirical studies, it remains unclear whether saving patterns are sensitive to changes in interest rates and, if so, in what direction. The increased private saving advertised as one of the main benefits of the 1981 "supply-side" cut in personal income tax rates has failed to materialize. Net personal savings stood at 7.5 percent of personal disposable income in 1981. By 1986, the personal saving rate had fallen to 3.8 percent-the lowest level since 1949.
The third option-substantial reduction of the government deficit, and in particular, the federal budget deficit-is by far the most feasible, if politically difficult. Although macroeconomists may disagree about the desirability of completely eliminating the federal deficit, there is a broad consensus in the policymaking community that the deficit must eventually be brought down from its current $150-$200 billion range to something on the order of $50 billion. There is also consensus that deficit reduction should take place gradually and, if the need arises, be temporarily halted or even reversed if the economy slides into recession.
RESISTING PROTECTION
Reversing overall trade patterns will not only be politically difficult, but also will take time. In the interim, during which the trade deficit may come down but still hover around $100 billion, there will be continuing political pressure to embrace protectionist measures. Indeed, despite its free trade convictions, the Reagan administration has resorted increasingly to protection, and in the worst way possible-by using quotas and sanctioning the creation of cartels.
A major reason why even an administration as philosophically committed to free trade as the present one has found it necessary to cave in to pressures for protection is that the two safety valves in our current trade regime for relieving protectionist pressures are imperfect.
The first, the so-called escape clause, allows domestic industries to receive temporary protection from imports when they can prove to the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) that imports threaten or cause them serious economic injury. Although the escape clause has been reasonably effective in screening out the most unworthy domestic industries and depriving them of temporary assistance-roughly 40 percent of all applicants since the law was last revised in 1974 have been denied relief by the ITC-it nevertheless has a fatal flaw. An industry can win its case before the ITC but still be denied relief by the president. The effect is to encourage the industry to run to Congress for permanent protection, as the domestic shoe and copper industries have done in the past two years. Another problem is that the law allows the president to provide temporary import relief in the form of quotas as well as tariffs. And while tariffs distort trade flows somewhat, they are less disruptive than quotas. They also, unlike quotas, raise revenue for the government.
The second safety valve, trade adjustment assistance (TAA) for firms, workers, and communities adversely affected by import competition, has been rendered increasingly ineffective because of severe funding cuts over the past five years. Moreover, even in its heyday, TAA did little more than delay adjustment, particularly by displaced workers, who were merely given extended unemployment compensation payments without being positively encouraged to find work elsewhere.
In our study, Saving Free Trade, we outline several changes in both the escape clause and the TAA program that would make them more useful.29 First, the escape clause would be more cost effective if declining tariffs were the sole form of temporary import relief. All existing quotas and other quantitative restrictions should be converted to their tariff equivalents by auction; that is, all rights to import products within quota ceilings should be sold to the highest bidders. Tariff rates should then be scheduled to decline over time. The revenue raised by these tariffs should be earmarked for assisting workers adversely affected by imports.
Second, we recommend that an affirmative injury finding by the International Trade Commission automatically trigger two different types of relief. First, mergers of firms in beleaguered industries not protected by quotas would be assessed under liberalized standards, as recently recommended by the Reagan administration. If an industry is judged by the ITC to be seriously damaged by imports, then there is little worry that mergers will lead to imperfect competition. Second, trade adjustment assistance, primarily in the form of insurance against loss of wages, would automatically be extended to displaced workers. By 29. See Robert Z. Lawrence and Robert E. Litan, Saving Free Trade, chap. 5, for more details. For a similar view, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Howard F. Rosen, Trade compensating workers for some proportion of any reduction in wages in new jobs, TAA would encourage workers to find and accept new employment, thus hastening adjustment. The proportion of the loss compensated could vary with the age of the worker and his or her seniority in the previous job. Extended unemployment compensation would be provided to workers residing in regions where the unemployment rate significantly exceeds the national average. Relocation allowances and assistance for retraining would also be available. Federal loans for retraining would carry repayment obligations tied to future earnings; repayments would be collected automatically through the income tax system.
Our proposed program of trade adjustment assistance could be readily financed for at least a decade by converting existing quotas into declining tariffs. As a result, there would be no financial pressures to impose new tariffs to fund the assistance program, although the president would still have authority to grant tariff remedies to domestic industries proving to the ITC that they merit relief.
Finally, we propose a system of insurance by which municipalities, counties, and states can ease the pain of economic dislocation. Participating governmental entities would pay an insurance premium, much like the premiums firms currently pay for unemployment compensation, for a policy that would compensate for losses in the tax base caused by plant closures or significant layoffs.
The United States will not be able to reverse its trade balance until national spending patterns change. But in the meantime, we must do a far better job in easing the difficult dislocations that the persistent trade imbalance has caused.
